Abstract
Both an emphasis on logic and an emphasis on rhetoric lead to a kind of care for language. However, in early Greece this care for language through the lens of logic manifested in the drive to ‘get it right’, whereas in early China the care for language manifested in the pervasive concern for zhengming, for using names properly. For the early Chinese thinkers, especially the early Confucians, this was not predominantly a linguistic affair—zhengming is a key component of moral cultivation. As we explore the ethical import of Confucian role ethics, we need to pay attention to the philosophical vocabulary of this worldview and to how our understanding of these crucial terms changes if persons are seen as relational—a central premise of Confucian role ethics. In this essay I argue against reading zhengming as fagu, merely a conservative retrieval of historical meaning, as suggested by the political philosopher Hsiao Kung-chuan, among others. Instead, I argue for three theses: (1) although stubbornly persistent, ‘rectification of names’ is not an adequate translation for zhengming; (2) the conservative reading of zhengming is problematic and needs to be rethought as an hermeneutic process intersecting past meanings, present circumstances, and future possibilities; and (3) zhengming is, in an important sense, the ‘art’ of Confucian role ethics, for achieving moral competency in this tradition is a matter of constantly revising one's roles and relationships.
Notes
Notes
[1] Many scholars, including David Hall and Roger Ames, Kurtis Hagen and Hsiao Kung-chuan, argue that there is a strong continuity regarding zhengming across many key Confucian texts, from the Analects to the Xunzi. This essay focuses on the ethical functions of zhengming and does not address the many contemporary debates regarding zhengming and logic, realism vs conventionalism, etc.
[2] The two hundred plus year span between the American revolution and today is roughly analogous to the amount of time between when Confucius lived and the height of the Zhou Dynasty.
[3] In Classical China personal names were somewhat more complex than a traditional western understanding of personal names. For example, in addition to a family name, a person of high status would have a style name, and various names associated with that person's status and work, as well as familial relationships. So a person's name in China, unlike in the west, was not fixed to that person from birth, but changed with age and social status.
[4] Analects 12.11, all translations are my own. ‘齊景公問 ‘政’ 於孔子。 孔子對曰: ‘君君 ， 臣臣 ， 父父 ， 子子.’ 公曰: “善哉! 信如君不君 ， 臣不臣 ， 父不父 ， 子不子 ， 雖有粟 ， 吾得而食諸?”’
[5] Analects 13.6: ‘子曰 ： 其身正 ， 不命而行 ； 其身不正 ， 雖命不從。 ’
[6] Analects 13.3: ‘君子於其言 ， 無所苟而已矣。 ’
[7] If we refer back to passage 12.11 and the idea of fathering as a father should, we can see that being a ‘bad father’ is, for the Confucians, properly understood as not being a father at all. Implicit in the role of father are certain responsibilities which make the role (and so the name) normative.
[8] As there is not room in this paper for an extended discussion of this topic, and it has been well covered in the literature, as a starting place for more on this see the Introduction to Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr's translation of the Analects, or Nathan Sivin and Geoffrey Lloyd's The Word and the Way.
[9] For more on this see especially sections 3 and 7 of the Rule of Metaphor (Ricoeur, Citation1975).
[10] Analects 2.11: ‘子曰 ： 溫故而知新 ， 可以為師矣。 ’
[11] Analects 13.3. ‘子路曰 ： “衛君待子而為政 ， 子將奚先?” 子曰 ： “必也正名乎!” 子路曰 ： “有是哉?子之迂也!奚其正?” 子曰 ： “野哉 ， 由也!君子於其所不知 ， 蓋闕如也。 名不正 ， 則言不順 ； 言不順 ， 則事不成 ； 事不成 ， 則禮樂不興 ； 禮樂不興 ， 則刑罰不中 ； 刑罰不中 ， 則民無所措手足。 故君子名之必可言也 ， 言之必可行也。 君子於其言 ， 無所苟而已矣”。 ’
[12] For more on the discussion of role ethics vs virtue ethics, see the Introduction to Rosemont and Ames (Citation2009). Although Rosemont and Ames are perhaps not as charitable to Aristotle as they are to Confucius, the issue of the philosophical danger that arises with too easily drawing similarities is one that needs to be taken seriously.